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PARTIES - RIGHT To SuE DEFENDANT BY FICTITIOUS NAME - Plaintiff
brought an action of detinue to repossess an \!lectric refrigerator against "John
Doe, whose name is to the plaintiff otherwise unknown, but will be inserted
by way of amendment when ascertained," in accordance with an Alabama
statute allowing suits to be started against defendants by a fictitious name.1
Writ of seizure issued on the same date as the summons, but the sheriff did not
make service. When it was found that the refrigerator was in the possession of a
woman, plaintiff ~mended the complaint to substitute "Mary Roe, whose name
is to the plaintiff otherwise unknown, etc." Service was again unsuccessful but
the property was seized. Plaintiff then amended the complaint to substitute
Cassie Dill and D. G. Ewing for the fictitious names. These parties appeared
and moved to discontinue, the trial court granting the motion. Held, reversed,
on the ground that there was not such a change of parties as would justify the
defendants' motion. McKelvey-Coats Furniture Co. v. Doe, (Ala. 1940) 198
So. 128.
Code provisions similar in form to the Alabama statute exist in about half
the states.2 A distinction should be noted between suits against defendant in a
fictitious name and suits against "unknown claimants" or "unknown heirs," the
latter applying more properly to in rem or quasi-in-rem suits where the intention is to preclude the rights of all claimants whether they have actual notice
of the suit or not, as in escheat actions. 8 Chief interest in the instant case lies in

1 Ala. Code (1928), § 5709: ''When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a
defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly."
2 47 C. J. 174, note 93 (1929); 22 CAL. L. J. 685 (1934); 2 BANCROFT,
CODE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES IIOI (1927).
8 In the "unknown claimants, etc." suits, any person claiming an interest can
come in and defend, whereas the following cases indicate that in the suits considered
here, it is for the plaintiff to indicate the party he is suing either by service of summons
or amendment to substitute the true naml:: Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco v.
Stockton Terminal & E. R. R., 44 Cal. App. 512, 185 P. 860 (1919); Union Tank
& Pipe Co. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 134 Cal. App. 229, 25 P. (2d) 262 (1933). In the
former type of cases, service by publication seems to be allowed, according to Hamilton
v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 16 S. Ct. 585 (1895), and Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn.
174, 48 N. W. 773 (1891). In the fictitious name suits, there must be personal
service to ground a judgment, for otherwise there is nothing to apprise defendant he
was the party intended. See Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57 N. W. 765 (1894)
which seems to be the only case in point, apparently because the issue did not arise
in other cases due to proper service on defendant.
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the court's h"beral interpr.etation of the statute. Reference is made to the statute
as an emergency one, applicable where neither the name nor identity of the
defendant is known. The Court further states that it is sufficient if plaintiff
merely follows the wording of the statute by averring that the name of the
defendant is unknown to him and will be inserted by way of amendment when
ascertained, although it would be better practice to aver any descriptive matter
known to plaintiff, tending to identify the defendant, which will aid the sheriff
in making service. The practitioner is confronted with two problems in the us~
of such a code provision: ( 1) conforming to procedural r.equirements, and
( 2) knowing when such a procedure can be used. Originally interpreted by the
courts rather strictly,4 there has been a tendency in recent years to construe this
type of statute liberally.5 Earlier decisions and some more recently hold that
even where the person intended as defendant appears and pleads, a judgment is
not binding unless plaintiff amends his complaint to substitute the true name of
the defendant for the fictitious one. 6 The more modern and'liberal rule seems
to be less strict.7 The better rule does not seem to require any particular effort
by plaintiff to ascertain defendant's true name before starting suit with a fictitious name, apparently in line with a liberal construction of what is obviously
an emergency statute. 8 But at least plaintiff must be actually ignorant of de~ Rosencrantz v. Rogers, 40 Cal. 489 (1871); McKinlay v. Tuttle, 42 Cal. 570
(1872); McCabe v. Doe, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 64 (1853).
5 Irving v. Carpentier, 70 Cal. 23, II P. 391 (1886); Roth v. Scruggs, 214 Ala.
32, 106 So. 182 (1925).
6 McCabe v. Doe, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 64 (1853); Farris v. Merritt, 63
Cal. II8 (1883); Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 134 Cal. App. 229,
25 P. (2d) 262 (1933). McKinlay v. Tuttle, 42 Cal. 570 (1872), even held that
where the true names of defendants appeared in the judgment, the latter was not
binding on them.
1 See Moore v. Lewis, 76 Mich. 300, 43 N. W. II (1889), where it was held
that when defendant appe~rs and pleads, failure to amend to substitute his true name
is immaterial, especially when it appeared correctly on appeal; Hoffman v. Keeton, 132
Cal. 195, 64 P. 264 (1901), holding that trial court's order directing an amendment
was sufficient; Blackburn v. Bucksport & E. R.R. R., 7 Cal. App. 649 at 654, 95 P. 668
(1908), holding that on appeal the appellate court will in its judgment direct the
lower court to amend the complaint as of a date prior to the original judgment, in order
to support it. Wisest course, however, would be always to amend when the defendant's
true name is discovered, if ever.
8 Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 64 P. 264 (1901), holding that plaintiff
was not required to search the records; Irving v. Carpentier, 70 Cal. 23, II P. 391
(1886), holding plaintiff need not search the land title records in county recorder's
office. In the last case, the court said plaintiff's ignorance could even be negligent,
since the statute was enabling, and time might be lacking for such a search, and the
party sued would not be injured anyway since he was personally served. But cf. Arizona
Land & Stock Co. v. Markus, 37 Ariz. 530, 296 P. 251 (1930), holding that recording
of a tax sale deed was constructive notice to plaintiff of defendant's true name and
hence judgment was not binding on him. But there, plaintiff had not used the .fictitious
name provision in an emergency situation, but rather in an escheat action, and since
it sought to preclude all possible claimants, the more stringent rule might be justified.
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fendant's true name and aver that fact in his complaint.9 The statute was not
intended to apply where plaintiff uses an actual name for a party but gets the
wrong person into court, for an amendment in this situation would be an
entire change of parties.10 The right to sue defendant by a fictitious name is of
especial value in three types of situations. The most common application is that
where the statute of limitations has nearly tolled a cause of action, but the name
of the defendant is still unknown. Use of the statute in this situation is possible
for the reason that defendant when served is deemed to have been a party from
the commencement of the action. 11 This procedure has been suggested as particularly valuable where the statutory period of limitation is extremely short, as
under statutes allowing only ninety days between filing of a mechanic's lien
and commencement of action upon it. 12 The second situation to which the
statute is applicable is where the plaintiff knows defendant has property which
can be attached, but does not know defendant's name and desires to prevent
removal of the property from the jurisdiction, as in the instant case. Another
occasion for application is where the defendant whose name is unknown has
committed a tort against the plaintiff and the latter desires to get out a complaint
and summons immediately, before the defendant leaves the jurisdiction.18

Oliver B. Crager

9 Brown v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199 N. W. 235 (1924) (dicta); 2 CARMODY, NEW YoRK PRACTICE, 2d ed., 1080 (1929); Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57
N. W. 765 (1894); Gardner v. Kraft, 52 N. Y. Prac. & Code Rep. (How. Pr.) 499
(1877); Crandall v. BC;ach, 7 How. Pr. 271 (1852).
10 Roth v. Scruggs, 214 Ala. 32, 106 So. 182 (1925); Baker v. Tormey, 209 Wis.
627, 245 N. W. 652 (1932).
11 Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 64 P. 264 (1901); Farris v. Merritt, 63
Cal. II8 (1883); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 285 (1932).
12 21 CAL. L. REv. 624 at 626 (1933).
18 Roth v. Scruggs, 214 Ala. 32, 106 So. 182 (1925), suggests in dicta such a
use of the fictitious name suit. This and the instant case are apparently the only two
saying identity of defendant may be unknown as well as defendant's name, but since
it is hard to know what is in the plaintiff's mind when he starts suit, it would seem
impossible to require knowledge of identity in practice. Tyrrel v. Seamen's Bank for
Savings, 57 App. Div. 381, 68 N. Y. S. 275 (1901), lays down the rule that the
statute can be used only against one known to exist, but in that case the bank sought
to bring in the "original depositor or his representatives," which immediately indicated to the court that plaintiff did not know whether defendant was alive or dead.
A similar statement is to be found in Reynolds v. May, 4 Greene (Iowa) 283 (1854),
but there the suit was directed against the "heirs of Otis Reynolds," and hence was
really an "unknown claimants" suit, rather than a fictitiously-named defendant suit.

